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REA v. WILDEBOER: THE OPPRESSION




IN May of 2015, the Court of Appeal for Ontario heard Rea v.
Wildeboer, a case involving the "murky" distinction between the de-
rivative action and the oppression remedy available to minority
shareholders.' Ultimately the Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Robert Blair, dismissed the oppression claim brought by a single share-
holder, holding that "unless the harm done was unique to [the share-
holder] and [the shareholder] alone," then an oppression claim is
inappropriate.2 Justice Blair made clear the specific grounds of the hold-
ing, noting that the present case was not "a case involving the overlap
between the oppression remedy and the derivative action," but "where
the facts may give rise to both a 'corporate claim' and a 'personal' oppres-
sion remedy claim . . . the question of whether an oppression remedy
proceeding is available will have to be sorted out on a case by case
basis."3
This "murky" line between the availability of a derivative action and
the oppression remedy is partially the result of the evolution of compet-
ing policy concerns in corporate management.4 These concerns involve
balancing the independence of the corporation and its directors to make
well-informed decisions on what they feel to be in the best interests of the
corporation with the ability of minority shareholders to be protected in
instances of actual oppression.5 Central to these concerns are the basic
corporate principles of indoor management and the corporate personality
rule.6 Before discussing the court's decision and rationale in Rea v.
Wildeboer, this paper will give a brief overview of the evolution of these
basic corporate principles, as well as an explanation of the process of
1. Rea v. Wildeboer, 2015 ONCA 373, at para. 2.
2. Yamri Taddese, Unique Harm Needed to Pursue Oppression Claim, CANADIAN
LAWYEUR MAGAZINE,, http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/legalfeeds/2715/unique-
harm-needed-to-pursue-oppression-claim.html?print=1 &tmpl=component.
3. Rea, 2015 ONCA 373, at para. 49.
4. Id. at para 2.
5. Rea, 2015 ONCA 373, at para. 14-21.
6. Id.
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bringing a derivative action and the availability of the oppression remedy
for minority shareholders.
II. CORPORATE FORMATION AND SHAREHOLDER
REMEDIES
A Canadian corporation may choose to incorporate under either the
Canada Business Corporations Act or other provincial legislation, such as
the Ontario Business Corporations Act (OBCA), which is the incorpora-
tion legislation at issue in Rea v. Wildeboer.7 Corporations are a popular
vehicle for conducting business in Canada because they provide a "flexi-
ble structure for business organizations," that gives the corporation free-
dom to structure themselves in a way that "provide[s] different levels of
participation, control and risk-taking in the corporation."8 As will be
seen in the later discussion of Rea v. Wildeboer, an important part of
corporate formation includes choosing whether to do business as a pri-
vate, often closely-held corporation or as a public corporation whose
shares "are listed on a stock exchange." 9
Once the corporation is validly formed, typically its "shareholders ...
have no authority to deal with the assets of the corporation and cannot
make legal commitments which bind the corporation," instead they
"maintain control of the corporation by voting their shares to elect direc-
tors who are, in turn, responsible for the management of the corpora-
tion." 10 Because of this, "minority shareholders in corporations ha[ve]
very little protection in the face of conduct by the majority . .. that nega-
tively affect[s] either the corporation itself or their interests as minority
shareholders."" As noted by Justice Blair, in his historical analysis in
Rea v. Wildeboer, this power structure "[is] due to two well-entrenched
common law principles of corporate law: the notion of a 'corporate per-
sonality' and the 'indoor management rule." 12
In cases where shareholders seek relief from the actions of the majority
of the board, often times their only form of relief comes in the form of a
derivative suit or an oppression claim.13 Generally, the oppression rem-
edy is available to "parties who believe that management or the board
have acted in a matter which was oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or
unfairly disregards their interests," and a derivative action is "for parties
seeking redress on behalf of the corporation for a breach of the corpora-
tion's rights." 14 The following sections will explore the often "murky"
7. Dentons Canada LLP, Doing Business in Canada, DENTONs 22, 23 (Mar. 2015),
http://www.dentons.com/en/insights/guides-reports-and-whitepapers/2015/march/1/
doing-business-in-canada-practical-considerations-for-investors
8. Id. at 22.
9. Id.; Rea, 2015 ONCA 373, at para. 29-31, 40.
10. Doing Business in Canada, supra note 7 at 21.
11. Rea, 2015 ONCA 373, at para. 14.
12. Id.
13. Id. at para. 15.
14. Doing Business in Canada, supra note 7 at 37.
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distinction between these two remedies and will also consider how the
availability of remedy is balanced with the long standing idea of corpo-
rate personality and indoor management.
A. CORPORATE PERSONALITY AND INDOOR MANAGEMENT RULE
It is a long standing rule in corporate law, that a corporation is a "legal
entity distinct from its shareholders." 1 5 This rule of corporate personality
was first applied in the famous English case of Foss v. Harbottle,16 which
stands for the idea that "a shareholder of a corporation . .. does not have
a personal cause of action for a wrong done to the corporation."17 With-
out a principle of corporate personality such as the Foss v. Harbottle rule,
there would be nothing barring a shareholder from bringing a suit against
"any director, officer, or shareholder alleged to have enriched themselves
at the company's 'expense."'1 8 This would undoubtedly open the corpo-
ration and the court up to the "obvious danger of a multiplicity of share-
holder suits."19 Many scholars also justify the importance of an
independent corporate personality, by arguing that "it is futile to allow
the minority to sue where the majority have the retrospective power, by
ratifying what has been done, to nullify any decision that a court may give
in favour of the minority." 20
This second justification is similar to the concept of the indoor manage-
ment rule, which provides that "if an act that was claimed to be wrongful
could be ratified by the majority at a general meeting of shareholders,
neither the corporation nor an individual shareholder could sue to re-
dress the wrong." 21 Similar to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, the indoor
management rule was first articulated in the English case of Royal British
Bank v. Turquand, later adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in JH
McKnight Construction Co v Vansickler, and eventually codified in both
the Canada Business Corporations Act and the OBCA. 2 2 Since it has
been codified in Canada, "courts have generally adopted a robust appli-
cation of the indoor management rule," 23 largely because courts are often
"reluctant to interfere in the internal management affairs of the
corporation." 2 4
15. Rea, 2015 ONCA 373, at para. 15.
16. A.J. BOYLE, MINORITY SI-IAREHOLDEIs' REMEDIES 3 (2011); see also Rea, 2015
ONCA 373, at para. 15 (noting the "continuing validity" of the Foss v. Harbottle
rule in Canada after the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Hercules Manage-
ment Ltd. v. Ernst & Young).
17. See Rea, 2015 ONCA 373, at para. 15.
18. Boyle, supra note 16 at 6.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 7.
21. Rea, 2015 ONCA 373, at para. 16.
22. Norm Emblem & Ara Basmadjian, The "Indoor Management Rule" Explained,




24. Rea, 2015 ONCA 373, at para. 16.
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B. DERIVATIVE SUIT AND OPPRESSION REMEDY
Because of the growth of concepts such as the independence of corpo-
rate personality and the indoor management rule, as well as the general
reluctance of courts to become involved in corporate governance, for
many years minority shareholders were often left without any powerful
defensive tactics.25 In fact "it took over a century for legislative reforms
to be put in place to temper the restrictive effect of these principles on
minority shareholder rights." 26 Perhaps two of the most powerful tools
for shareholder relief that were created during this era of legislative re-
form are the oppression remedy and the derivative suit. 2 7
The oppression remedy is available without any leave requirements to
a complainant "in order to recover for wrongs done to the individual
complainant by the company or as a result of the affairs of the company
being conducted in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to
or that unfairly disregards the interests of the complainant." 2 8 The first
oppression remedy that was adopted in England in 1948 cited "two spe-
cific examples of 'abuse,"' that would qualify as oppressive conduct, in-
cluding, "the refusal of directors to register transfers of shares resulting
from the death of a shareholder ... and the taking of excessive remunera-
tion by the directors." 29 The nature of an oppression action and what is
considered to be "oppression" has changed since this first inclusion of the
oppression remedy in legislation.30 For example, the OBCA has expan-
sive language that goes beyond the two specific examples listed above. 31
Under Section 248 of the Act, the oppression remedy is available to a
complainant where corporate action is "unfairly prejudicial to or . .. un-
fairly disregards the interests of any security holder, creditor, director or
officer of the corporation." 3 2
A derivative suit, in contrast to a personal oppression action, is brought
"where it is the corporation that is injured by the alleged wrongdoing." 33
Therefore, unlike a personal oppression action, where the harm must
have a "differential impact on shareholders," a derivative action is appro-
priate when "all shareholders are affected equally, with none experienc-
ing any special harm." 34 In a derivative action, the recovery is to the
corporation not the shareholder, because the "injury to shareholders is
25. See id. at para. 14.
26. Id. at para. 17.
27. See id.; see also, Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, The Oppression Remedy, Personal or Deriv-
ative?, 70 THE CANADIAN BAR REV. 29 (1991).
28. Rea, 2015 ONCA 373, at para. 19.
29. MacIntosh, supra note 27 at 30.
30. Id. at 34 (noting the change in the application of the oppression remedy from small
closely held corporations to larger publicly held corporations).
31. See Rea, 2015 ONCA 373, at para. 2; Ontario Business Corporations Act, R.S.O.
1994, c. 27, s. 71 (33).
32. Ontario Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16, s. 248 (2).
33. MacIntosh, supra note 27 at 30.
34. Id.
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only indirect."35 For example, even though "the value of shares in the
company is diminished by the conduct," of the corporation, it only indi-
rectly harms the shareholders and the harm is uniformly felt amongst the
shareholders." 3 6 On the other hand if the "directors of a corporation re-
fuse to accept the proxies of a shareholder at an annual meeting," the
action is a personal one," and the specific shareholder's injury is unique
to him only.37
In order to bring a derivative action, the preliminary requirements set
forth in the incorporation legislation, which almost always include the
court granting leave, must be fulfilled before the suit can commence.38
For example, under the Canada Business Corporations Act and similar
provincial legislation, there are three general "conditions precedent that
must be satisfied before the court will grant leave." 3 9 These conditions
include: "(1) reasonable notice to the directors; (2) a finding that the
complainant is acting in good faith; (3) it appears to be in the interests of
the corporation that the action be brought." 40
As is evident from the above discussion, although the basic distinction
between the two forms of shareholder relief is whether the injury was
personal or corporate in nature, there can be significant overlap between
the oppression remedy and the derivative suit; such is seen in cases where
the injury is both corporate and personal. In Malata Group Ltd. v. Jung
("Malata"), The Court of Appeal for Ontario explored the distinction be-
tween the two shareholder remedies and held that "there is not a bright
line distinction between the claims that may be advanced under the deriv-
ative action section of the [OBCA] and those that may be advanced
under the oppression remedy provisions." 41 Instead, the court must "ex-
amine the relevant statutory text and the facts of the claim at issue" to
decide, based on the type of harm done, whether the oppression remedy
or a derivative suit is more appropriate. 42
Malata itself involved a closely held Ontario corporation "that im-
ported and sold consumer electronic products manufactured in China." 43
35. Id. at 31.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 32.
39. Id.; Ontario Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16, s. 246 (2) (The Onta-
rio Business Corporations Act, which is the incorporation legislation for the corpo-
ration in Rea v. Wildeboer, includes the following requirements before a derivative
action can be commenced: "No action may be brought and no intervention in an
action may be made under subsection (1) unless the complainant has given four-
teen days' notice to the directors of the corporation or its subsidiary of the com-
plainant's intention to apply to the court under subsection (1) and the court is
satisfied that, (a) the directors of the corporation or its subsidiary will not bring,
diligently prosecute or defend or discontinue the action; (b) the complainant is
acting in good faith; and (c) it appears to be in the interests of the corporation or
its subsidiary that the action be brought, prosecuted, defended or discontinued.").
40. Macintosh, supra note 27 at 32.
41. Malata Group Ltd. v. Jung, 89 O.R. 36, 37 (2008).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 39.
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The harm for which the suit was commenced involved the misappropria-
tion of corporate funds which "threatened the business life of the com-
pany and rendered [it] incapable of paying its debt to the [minority
shareholder], "who was also a creditor of the corporation. 4 4 Because the
minority. shareholder's role as a creditor rendered the harm unique to
him only, the Court found that the case was "properly advanced under
the oppression remedy section of the [OBCA]." 4 5 In Rea v. Wildeboer,
the Court was again faced with a similar appeal; however, in this recent
case the Court explored the distinction within the realm of a large pub-
licly held corporation, where the harm was not as clearly personal in
nature.
III. ONTARIO COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
IN REA V. WILDEBOER
Martinrea is a publicly held Canadian corporation specializing in auto
parts manufacturing. 46 It has "approximately 84.5 million outstanding
shares," and its stock is traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange. 4 7 Mr.
Rea, along with Fred Jackel, who is a named defendant in the case at
hand, were the founding members of Martinrea. 48 In September 2013,
Mr. Natale Rea brought suit in the case, alleging that certain corporate
insiders, including directors and executives, "undertook a series of trans-
actions and other activities that involved a breach of fiduciary and other
duties to Martinrea result[ing] in the misappropriation of large amounts
of Martinrea's corporate funds." 4 9 This misappropriation of corporate
funds resulted in losses of "$50 to $100 million" to the corporation.5 0 Mr.
Rea's action in the Superior Court of Justice of Ontario sought to "re-
cover the funds for Martinrea," through an oppression claim and the "dis-
gorgement of the ill-gotten gains back to Martinrea" but not to recover
for any personal loss. 51 Whether Mr. Rea as a claimant can proceed
under an oppression claim without a showing of unique personal harm,
thereby circumventing the leave requirements of a derivative suit, was the
central issue addressed on appeal.52
In addition to being a founding member of Martinrea, Mr. Rea through
his corporation, Rea Holdings, Inc., "[was] a significant minority share-
holder of [Martinrea] - holding 12% to 17% of its shares," from 2002 to
2012.53 Mr. Rea also served on the board of directors of the corporation
alongside Jaekel, Wildeboer, Orland, and Rashid, who were all named
44. Id.
45. Id. at 47.
46. Rea, 2015 ONCA 373, at para. 4
47. Id.
48. Id. at para. 5.
49. Id. at para. 5, 7.
50. Id. at para. 7, 45
51. Id.
52. Id. at para. 2-3.
53. Id. at para. 6.
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defendants and referred to collectively, along with other executives, as
"insider" directors. 54 In seeking the recovery of the corporate funds that
were lost by the inside directors, Mr. Rea alleged that among other
things, the insiders bought equipment and a land parcel at prices well
above market value in transactions where the insiders themselves "re-
ceived substantial kickbacks." 55
When Mr. Rea became aware of the improper transactions, which cost
the corporation a significant amount of money, he brought the informa-
tion to defendants Wildeboer and Rashid, the Executive Chairman and
head of the Audit Committee, respectively. 56 The audit committee pre-
pared a report that, according to Mr. Rea, was a "complete whitewash" of
the facts underlying the issue. 5 7 Wholly unsatisfied with the resolution of
the problem, Mr. Rea sold his shares and those that were held by his
company, Rea Holdings, Inc., and removed himself from the Board of
Directors and his position as Vice-Chairman.5 8 Upon commencing the
action in the case in September 2013, Mr. Rea reacquired 1% or 100,000
of Martinrea's outstanding shares.59
A. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
At the heart of Mr. Rea's argument was the claim that the oppression
remedy and the derivative action are essentially a distinction without a
difference, and as such he should be able to proceed under an oppression
claim even in the absence of personalized harm.60 His argument relied
heavily on the Malata case which, as discussed above, stands for the idea
that there is "a degree of overlap between claims that could be made out
as a derivative action and those that fall under the oppression remedy." 61
Therefore, Mr. Rea argued that he was "entitled to pursue an oppression
remedy" because his "reasonable expectations ha[d] been violated by
means of conduct caught by the terms 'oppression,' 'unfair prejudice,' or
'unfair disregard," regardless of whether "the wrong in question is a
wrong in respect of the corporation." 6 2 According to Mr. Rea, the "ratio-
nale" behind the oppression remedy lends it to be broadly interpreted
giving shareholders "a personal statutory right not to have their reasona-
ble expectations violated." 63
On the other hand, the respondents' argument took issue with the
plaintiff's claim that the oppression remedy and the derivative suit are
"not mutually exclusive," arguing that the distinction between the two
54. Id. at para. 5.
55. Id. at para. 9.
56. Id. at para. 10.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at para. 6.
60. Id. at para. 22.
61. Id. at para. 23; see also Malata Group, 89 O.R. 36, 45.
62. Rea, 2015 ONCA 373, at para. 22.
63. Id.
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remedies remains . . . for good reason," pointing to the importance be-
hind the leave requirement in derivative suits.64 Specifically, they men-
tioned three important reasons for the leave requirement in filing a
derivative suit that would almost certainly be destroyed if the oppression
remedy was read as broadly as the claimants argued. 6 5 Those reasons
included the function of the derivative suit in "preventing strike suits,"
"preventing meritless suits," and "avoiding a multiplicity of proceedings -
all of which may lead to the corporation incurring significant and unwar-
ranted costs. ."66 In contrast to Mr. Rea's argument, the respondents
distinguished the facts of the case at hand with the Malata case, pointing
out that in cases involving closely-held corporations, "there is less reason
to require the plaintiff to seek leave of the court," because the small size
of the corporation naturally "minimizes the risk of frivolous lawsuits." 6 7
Therefore, given that the facts in the present case do not involve a small
closely-held corporation, according to the respondents, Mr. Rea can only
pursue a remedy through a derivative action. 68
B. COURT's DISCUSSION AND HOLDING
In deciding whether Mr. Rea's oppression claim was the appropriate
cause of action, the Court concluded that given the facts, the claims for
disgorgement of the "ill-gotten gains" of the inside directors and execu-
tives must be pursued through a derivative action.6 9 The Court, while
finding that the "derivative action and the oppression remedy are not
mutually exclusive," 70 ultimately held that because Mr. Rea did not expe-
rience any "unique" harm as a result of the mismanagement of corporate
funds, only a derivative suit and recovery to the corporation would be
appropriate.7 t
Justice Blair did note that the oppression remedy was intended as a
"broad and flexible form of relief." 72 Even so, out of respect for corpo-
rate management and independence, he steered away from the "open en-
ded approach" of equating the oppression remedy and the derivative suit,
holding that "the impugned conduct must [still] harm the complainant
personally, not just the body corporate." 73 The Court recognized the de-
bate, which was briefly discussed above, in "how to treat cases where
there is an overlap" in personal and corporate harm, but did not find it
"necessary to resolve it" here given that the Mr. Rea's accusations did not
64. Id. at para. 23, 24.
65. Id. at para. 25.
66. Id. at para. 24.
67. Id. at para. 25; see also, Malata Group, 89 O.R. 36, 47.
68. Rea, 2015 ONCA 373, at para. 24.
69. Id. at para. 45.
70. Id. at para. 26, 45.
71. Yamri Taddese, Unique Harm Needed to Pursue Oppression Claim, CANADIAN
LAWYER MAGAZINE:, http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/legalfeeds/27.15/unique-
harm-needed-to-pursue-oppression-claim.html?print=1&tmpl=component.
72. Rea, 2015 ONCA 373, at para. 33.
73. Id.
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involve any such overlap. 74
The Court also carefully pointed out that most cases involving the pos-
sible overlapping of causes of action "involve small closely-held corpora-
tions not public companies," distinguishing Malata's relevance to the case
at hand.7 5 Further, unlike the harm done to Martinrea, a large publicly
held corporation, in Malata the misappropriation of corporate funds, di-
rectly affected the small, closely-held corporation and the minority share-
holder, who was also a creditor of the corporation. 76 Because the harm
to the shareholder-creditor was unique and did not come indirectly as a
result of the harm to the corporation, the Court found that an oppression
claim was appropriate.7 7
Finally, the Court clarified that in order to successfully bring a cause of
action under an oppression remedy there must be more than "boiler plate
repetition of the statutory language from the OBCA describing the op-
pression remedy." 78 For example, the Court made clear that the oppres-
sion remedy is not available . . . simply because a complainant asserts a
"reasonable expectation and the evidence supports that the reasonable
expectation has been violated by conduct falling within the terms oppres-
sion, unfair prejudice, or unfair disregard."7 9 Instead, the Court reiter-
ated that in order to properly proceed under an oppression claim and
"cross the line - however "murky" that line may be - between the deriva-
tive reality of this action and its proposed oppression remedy," the ac-
tions must be more than "wrongs done to the corporation," but must
amount to personalized harm.8 0
IV. CONCLUSION
Even though most of the Court's discussion in Rea v. Wildeboer at-
tempts to clarify what Justice Blair admits is the murky line between the
oppression remedy and derivative actions, ultimately, because of the facts
presented, the Court refuses to adopt a bright line rule or even get rid of
the line altogether.8 1 By deciding to rule narrowly, based on the facts at
hand and leave the bigger policy question to a case by case determina-
tion, the Court found a way to both respect the claims of the minority
shareholders and still maintain the effectiveness of long-standing corpo-
rate policies such as the indoor management rule and corporate personal-
ity.8 2 Also, by refusing to read the oppression remedy as broad and
almost limitless, the Court appropriately balanced corporate indepen-
dence with the rights of the shareholder by leaving the derivative action
74. Id. at para. 28, 29.
75. Id. at para. 29.
76. Id. at para. 31.
77. Malata Group, 89 O.R. 36, 47.
78. Rea, 2015 ONCA 373, at para. 32.
79. Id. at para. 34.
80. Id. at para. 42, 47.
81. See id. at para. 26-46.
82. See id. at para. 49.
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and the leave requirements in place.8 3 Reading the oppression remedy
narrowly, however, means that in some instances where the shareholder
may rightfully "feel personally aggrieved given their substantial share-
holding" in a corporation that suffered loss at the hands of the directors,
unless the harm was "unique," a derivative action may still be the only
way to proceed. 84
83. See id. at para. 33.
84. Taddese, supra note 71.
